I began writing the Sci Phi column for the magazine in 1998 (TMP issue 4). The aim of the column is to discuss scientific research which is of interest or relevant to philosophical research.

If you know of any scientific research which you think would make a good Sci Phi article, please email me with the details.

To see what has already been covered, check out the list of Sci Phi articles below.

In TPM 5 I argue that Albert Einstein’s theory of special relativity has profound implications for some of our deepest held beliefs concerning free will.

In TPM 6 I discuss Roger Sperry’s research into ‘spilt brain’ patients - epileptics with an artificially severed corpus callosum - and the implications of this research for our sense of self.

In TPM 7 I describe some of the psychological experiments that expose how misleading and mistaken our powers of reasoning can sometimes be.

In TPM 8 I consider whether classical mind brain dualism (or Cartesian Dualism as it is sometimes called, after it's most famous exponent, René Descartes) is at odds with the law of conservation of energy.

In TPM 9 I argue that Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, like special relativity, has profound implications for some of our deepest held beliefs concerning free will.

In TPM 10 I ask whether philosophy should aim to be consistent with common sense or instead follow the example of much of science, and simply ignore it.

In TPM 11 I discuss Frans de Waal’s arguments in support of the view that the higher African apes are capable of making moral judgements.

In TPM 12 I consider Julian Barbour’s claim that relativity (the physics of the very large) and quantum theory (the physics of the very small) can be reconciled if one accepts that time and motion are illusory.

In TPM 13 I describe some of the features of artificial neural networks used by the neural engineer Igor Aleksander in his attempt to build a conscious mind.

In TPM 14 I discuss Benjamin Libet’s experiments concerning the neurophysiology of voluntary acts and their origins in unconscious brain processes.

In TPM 15 I consider how concepts in non-equilibrium physics can explain complex unpredictable events such as earthquakes, stock market crashes and military conflicts.

In TPM 16 I ask if we can reach a coherent definition of materialism or physicalism given the vague and mysterious nature of physical matter.

In TPM 17 I consider whether Charles Darwin was a scientist or a philosopher, in response to the recent TPM poll in which ‘The Origin of Species’ was voted the third greatest philosophical work of all time.

In TPM 18 I discuss infinitesimals: the infinitely small quantities that are so crucial to certain areas of science and philosophy.

In TPM 19 I describe John Taylor’s attentional model of consciousness, CODAM or Corollary Discharge of Attention Movement.

In TPM 20 I discuss the increasing number of physicists who believe that there may be a deeper, non-probabilistic, level of reality underlying quantum theory.

In TPM 21, in response to the Nuffield Council’s report ‘Genetics and Human Behaviour: the Ethical Context’, I ask whether ‘genetic determinism’ could be used as a defence in a court of law.

In TPM 22 I ask whether philosophy can learn anything from the recent controversies in science involving fabrication of data, publication of duplicate research and poor quality of refereeing.

In TPM 23 I describe the work of the computational neuroscientist Upinder Bhalla who tries to understand consciousness by using computer simulated structurally realistic models of neural systems.

In TPM 24 I discuss the growing number of scientists who believe that consciousness will only be fully explained by appealing to the quantum processes that underlie neuronal processes.

In TPM 25 I describe a hypothetical experiment which may allow one to observe the seemingly unobservable: a quantum superposition of states.

In TPM 26 I discuss the psychological phenomenon of ‘conflict of intentions’ in which subjects become frozen to the spot by their desire to carry out two conflicting intentions at the same time.

In TPM 27 I consider James Hartle’s explanation of why we experience time as divided into past, present and future when physics tells us that the world is four-dimensional with no unique division into space and time.

In TPM 28 I describe Shahriar Afshar’s attempt to refute Niels Bohr’s ‘principle of complementarity’ using a variation of the famous ‘double-slit’ experiment.

In TPM 29 I discuss the discovery of the new hominid Homo floresiensis and the implications this has for our understanding of the evolution of our own species.

In TPM 30 I call upon philosophers to celebrate the centenary of Einstein's annus mirabilis, 1905, and his remarkable contribution to science and philosophy through his discovery of special relativity, quantum optics and that E=MC2.

In TPM 31 I look at research from the cognitive sciences which contradicts the view defended by the linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky that our ability to use mathematical concepts is fundamentally dependent upon our ability to use language.

In TPM 32 I discuss the experimental realisation of Karl Popper's variation of the so-called EPR paradox of Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen.

In TPM 33 I describe a study by the anthropologist Joan Silk on indirect reciprocity in chimpanzees and consider how it relates to the evolution of morality in humans. 

In TPM 34 I discuss some of the advances in biomolecular engineering which may soon enable us to create artificial life in the laboratory.

In TPM 35 I describe a study by the psychologist Timothy Gentner, which appears to show that starlings can display the linguistic ability known as syntactic recursion. 

In TPM 36 I discuss the positive influence upon scientific progress of disagreement between academics and ask why disagreement between academics in philosophy often has the opposite affect.

In TPM 37 I look at the work of researchers at Cornell University’s Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering department, who have created a robot that has a primitive sense of self.

In TPM 38 I describe several studies by the psychologist Marc Hauser and others, which indicate that we are born with an innate moral faculty, analogous to our language faculty.

In TPM 39 I return once again to the EPR paradox and discuss the work of the physicist Simon Gröblacher and its implications for physical reality.

In TPM 40 I review the recent research into rational decision making which illustrates the extraordinary fallibility of human judgement.

In TPM 41 I discuss the paradox that is the Quantum Zeno affect and its implications for the cognitive sciences.